Brits got it wrong in Iraq; we are, too

Recently, I wrote in this space about how history teaches us cruel lessons, that if unlearned will only be repeated. It appears we are about again to ignore history and seek a way out of the quagmire that is Iraq with a "surge" of 21,500 troops to stem the insurgency in Baghdad. This is in addition to the 135,000 (give or take 10,000, depending on the day of the week) U.S. troops already there.

What this "surge" is supposed to accomplish is not clear: Clean up Baghdad and Al Anbak province, or just allow a supposedly free government to run its own country. But look back to when the British invaded Iraq in 1914 with 90,000 British and India Army soldiers. The Brits were dealing with a country of 10 million, roughly divided along the same sectarian and tribal lines as today's Iraq.

The British figured the Iraqis ought to be grateful for their good works of outing the Turkish occupiers (remember how we were supposed to be greeted with bouquets?). But the Iraqis oddly enough did not want Britain to run their country, and a vast insurrection emerged against the now-133,000 British troops (number sound familiar?). The anti-guerrilla (read insurgent) campaign eventually cost six times as much as the entire World War I campaign in the Middle East. When the ground war became a stalemate, the British used air power, as the United States is doing now. Its effectiveness was limited.

Today, we deal with an Iraq of 25 million people with a modest increase in troops over what the Brits had there. We have had no more success; essentially, the Brits said enough is enough, and brought in a man named Faisal, whom the French had ejected from Syria, to run the country. They realized there was no way 133,000 troops could put down an insurgency of 10 million. Yet we are trying to do that same thing with 135,000 troops in a country of 25 million. Bad numbers.

The revolt that eventually (inevitably?) emerged in 1920 horrified the British government. Efforts to find a way out resulted in Faisal.

Interestingly, T.E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia"), who had actually spent time in the Middle East, understood the problems better than most of those deputed to solve them. In August 1920, he wrote a letter to the London Sunday Times:

"The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia (Iraq) into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor. They have been tricked into it by a steady withholding of information. The Baghdad communiqués are belated, insincere, incomplete ... We are, today, not far from a disaster."

How does that compare with the endless litany by Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney and President Bush about how we are "winning" the Iraq war, repeated over and over again during the last two years, when it was clear we were not winning?

It seems that any surge of troops simply ignores the number lessons of history: with the Brits, 133,000 against 10 million, with us, 135,000 (plus surge) in a more complex country of 25 million. It just doesn't add up.

Faisal lasted a few years, then his son took over until he crashed in a sports car and died. Then his son ruled from the age of 4, and was eventually executed along with his government in the 1960s. That was when the Baath Party took over and Saddam Hussein came to power as a dictator. There is a tradition in Iraq of the strongman, not just in reference to the late Saddam , but to the concept of a strongman at the head of the country.

The London Times wrote:

23 Aug 1920

Mesopotamia. A Serious War Before Us. Causes of the Trouble.

[One can] see not only the struggle round Baghdad but some of the issues flowing from it to Jerusalem, Damascus, Delhi, Tehran ... Baghdad is already half-isolated. ... Ramadi and Fallujah have garrisons cut off from Baghdad. ... [T]he troops suffer the torture of an Inferno, and heavy reinforcements are required. Whatever the ultimate limits of Mesopotamia may be, no escape existed from the duty of maintaining the military occupation. That proved to be an intolerable financial burden, but the event proves that we attempted it with too few rather than too many troops, and the cheap policy of policing by local levies has proved unsuccessful.

8 Sep 1920

What Is Happening in Mesopotamia? (editorial)

We must protest once more against the extremely patchy and inadequate bulletins issued by the War Office regarding the operations in Mesopotamia. The nation finds itself involved in a serious war [in Iraq], and the ration strength of our forces ... must by now greatly exceed 100,00 men. The War Office rarely gives any clear idea of the situation, and sometimes leaves us almost entirely in the dark.

2 Feb 1921

Baghdad or Basra. Facing Facts in Mesopotamia. The Dilemma. Retirement Or Further Loss.

Eliminating all questions of Imperial security, prestige or mandatory civilizing mission, undoubtedly Mesopotamia is at present a bad investment for the British taxpayer. The present, nominal estimated ordinary expenditure is 25 million pounds a year; actually, it is far greater. How can we most safely cut the losses?

18 July 1921

Mesopotamia Editorial

Mr. Churchill got to the root of the Mesopotamia issue when he said, on June 14, that our "obligation" there is not "unlimited," that a point might be reached when no more sacrifices could be demanded from British taxpayers, and that the time might come when "the conditions of our finance or our military resources were such that we could do no more" for Mesopotamia. Every child at school has heard of Babylon and its tragic fate; and the mounds of rubble which are all that now recall the vanished glories of the Babylonian empire may still serve to remind our rulers that every Power which has sought to control these dismal lands has met with ultimate disaster.

History as déjà vu?

• Contact reporter Sam Bauman at sbauman@nevadaappeal.com or 881-1236.